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Abstract 
Mr. Russell’s Problems of Philosophy is generally considered a classic text within the history of 
philosophy. This is, however, not the case: every ‘original’ idea therein had been presented by Mr. 
Russell previously; the book is replete with unoriginal ideas; and a great deal of everything that is 
considered ‘philosophy’ is ignored in the book. The problematics under discussion are, ultimately, 
only those of Mr. Russell’s own understanding of philosophy which, as Analytic Philosophy, is 
quite narrow. Furthermore, what Mr. Russell says in the book is not without its opponents. 
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Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy 
London, Williams & Norgate, 1912, viii + 250 pp., index and bibliography. 
 
This work, it has been properly said, is of great interest.1 Admirably clear both in statement and in 
arrangement,2 any contemporary student of philosophy would be left wanting if this book did not 
constitute some part of their studies. It is, after all, meant as an introduction to philosophy:3 with 
linguistic simplicity and a lack of high seriousness,4 it seems prime for the general reader.5  
It is not, however, either novel or important.6 All of the views in the book have been 
presented before, and in greater detail.7 His views on universals had been offered up the previous 
year.8 His distinction between acquaintance and description half a dozen years before that;9 then a 
‘paradigm of philosophy’. 10  And his delineation of propositional, procedural and personal 
knowledge is one which has been known to philosophers for some time.11 Nor is his discussion of 
relations especially avant-garde: Thomas Hill Green ‘talks of hardly anything else’.12 Mr. Russell’s 
criticism of Kant13 is ‘almost word for word the same’ as Green’s,14 as is his theory of falsehood.15 
He deploys the distinction between a mental act and its object against George Berkeley16 in the 
 
 
1 Bosanquet, 1912: 556; The Journal of Education, 1912: 246. cf. Egner et al., 2009: xxx.  
2 Bosanquet, 1912: 556-557; Turner, 1913: 163-164. Egner et al., 2009: xxx-xxxi. 
3 Skorupski, 2001: vii. 
4 Russell, 2009: xv. 
5 Turner, 1913: 161, 163-164. 
6 Contra Bosanquet, 1912: 556-557; Egner et al., 2009: xxxi; Skorupski, 2001: vii, x, xi.  
7 Bosanquet, 1912: 556. 
8 Russell, 1911. 
9 Russell, 1905. 
10 Ramsey, 2001: 263; Sparkes, 1991: 199; Ludlow, 2005. 
11 Skorupski, 2001: x.  
12 Bosanquet, 1912: 558. 
13 Russell, 1912: 132. 
14 Green, 1911: 8-9; Bosanquet, 1912: 561. 
15 Green, 1969: §23; Bosanquet, 1912: 563. 
16 Russell, 1912: 21-22.  
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same way Thomas Reid did,17 to whose common-sense school Mr. Russell’s method belongs.18 
And a strange realism permeates the text, closely following John Locke’s doctrine.19  
The book is also limited, although this was purposive. Somewhat surprisingly, from a 
polymath, 20  Mr. Russell confines himself to only what he can speak positively about; 21 
epistemology and not metaphysics;22 and consequently omits many topics much discussed by 
philosophers.23 This limitation, however, is greater than Mr. Russell imagines,24 since philosophy 
goes beyond the logic, epistemology and linguistics of his analytic school.25 It is perhaps more 
properly considered ‘the problems of epistemology’ or ‘some problems of analytic philosophy’. 
Unconcerned with inventing comforting answers, but rather with gaining new insights,26 
Mr. Russell builds his epistemology sequentially.27 The book begins with a strikingly Cartesian 
question: ‘Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could 
doubt it?’.28 Thus begins an analysis of perception.29 He gives the name ‘sense-data’ to what are 
‘immediately known in sensation’.30 Bergson calls these ‘images’ and other philosophers call them 
‘presentations’.31 Sense-data are caused by physical objects. They are mental insofar as they are 
 
 
17 Skorupski, 2001: x. 
18 Skorupski, 2001: ix. 
19 Bosanquet, 1912: 558-559. 
20 Slater, 2009: ix. 
21 Russell, 1912: v; Bosanquet, 1912: 556; Turner, 1913: 161; Skorupski, 2001: vii. 
22 Russell, 1912: v; Bosanquet, 1912: 556; Skorupski, 2001: vii. 
23 Turner, 1913: 161. 
24 cp. Russell, 1912: 237. 
25 cf. Honderich, 2005: 973. 
26 Egner et al., 1992: 216. 
27 Contra Turner, 1913: 161.  
28 Russell, 1912: 9. cf. Descartes, 2013: 41 ff.  
29 Skorupski, 2001: viii. 
30 Russell, 1912: 17.  
31 Carr, 1914: 28. 
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private to the subject’s mind, but they are supposedly not mental states.32 Physical objects are not 
observed; instead their sense-data are the object of a subject’s awareness.33 This seems perverse, 
but it is probably because appearance and reality are intuitively synonymous.34 Ultimately, what 
we can know about physical objects is only their relational structure, not their intrinsic nature.35 
But before this, physical objects must be established to exist at all,36 so he sets about rejecting 
solipsism 37  and idealism. 38  The former is logically possible, 39  the latter is fallacious. 40  The 
common-sense belief in matter is instinctive and simple: though it may be false, it may be 
abductively accepted.41 
Having established what can be known, Mr. Russell addresses how it can be known. 
‘Anything of which we are directly aware’ is known by acquaintance.42 This means sense-data, but 
extends to memory, introspection, universals and probably to the self.43 An object is known by 
description when we know that it is ‘the so-and-so’.44 This includes physical objects and other 
minds, which we know but are not acquainted with.45 Of the connexion between knowledge and 
understanding, he says: ‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of 
constituents with which we are acquainted’.46 
 
 
32 cp. Bosanquet, 1912: 557. 
33 Russell, 1912: 23-24.  
34 cf. The Journal of Education, 1912: 246. 
35 Russell, 1912: 49 ff. 
36 Russell, 1912: 24. 
37 Russell, 1912: 26 ff. 
38 Russell, 1912: 21 ff., 58 ff. 
39 Russell, 1912: 27, 34.  
40 Russell, 1912: 21, 57.  
41 Russell, 1912: 31, 35, 38.  
42 Russell, 1912: 73.  
43 Russell, 1912: 75, 76, 77, 81, 80.  
44 Russell, 1912: 83. 
45 Russell, 1912: 81. 
46 Russell, 1912: 91.  
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Having spoken of knowledge of particulars, Mr. Russell considers knowledge of principles. 
Principles are ‘self-evident’,47 though self-evidence has its degrees.48 They are understood through 
experience, but it is realised that the particularity is irrelevant, and they are then known a priori.49 
This includes the propositions of pure mathematics, logic and ethics.50 Mr. Russell is a realist and 
denies that a priority is in some sense mental:51 principles are about things, not about thoughts.52 
He is also a Platonist and affirms that these things are neither physical nor mental,53 but rather 
qualities and relations.54 And relations belong to the ‘world of universals’.55 
The Russellian world of universals is different from the Platonic world of forms. Mr. 
Russell’s reinterpretation of the forms is designed to make the two meet, but is overall a 
misinterpretation.56 It does not necessarily cohere with his account some three decades later;57 but 
then he admits of variation in his philosophic views.58 But this is beside the point, which is to 
elucidate universality. Qualities cannot be proven but relations can,59 because the relation of 
resemblance cannot be denied.60 Universals therefore subsist. As for knowledge of universals: 
‘All a priori knowledge deals exclusively with the relations of universals’.61 There is no principle 
to decide which universals can be known by acquaintance, but sensible qualities, relations of space 
 
 
47 Russell, 1912: 112-113.  
48 Russell, 1912: 183. 
49 Russell, 1912: 110 ff., 116 ff. cf. Whitehead, 1911. 
50 Russell, 1912: 125. 
51 Russell, 1912: 136. 
52 Russell, 1012: 138.  
53 Russell, 1912: 152; Turner, 1913: 162.  
54 Russell, 1912: 139.  
55 Russell, 1912: 142 ff. 
56 Bosanquet, 1912: 564. 
57 cf. Russell, 1945: 119 ff.  
58 Russell, 2009: xiv. 
59 Russell, 1912: 149.  
60 Russell, 1912: 151.  
61 Russell, 1912: 162.  
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and time, similarity, and certain abstract logical universals can be known. 62  Empirical 
generalizations differ from a priori propositions insofar as the evidence for the former must be 
particular, whereas the latter is universal.63 
These propositions are truth-apt,64 whereas actual sense-data are neither true nor false.65 
Acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive but errant inferences may be drawn.66 Truth consists in 
coherence and falsity in incoherence.67 What distinguishes knowledge from probable opinion is 
the degree of coherence.68 What distinguishes knowledge from true belief is whether it has been 
deduced from known or false premisses.69 
This epistemology seems bleak. We are left only a piecemeal investigation of the world.70 
Mr. Russell believes, however, that this is how philosophy is supposed to be:71 in itself, it only 
diminishes the risk of error.72 ‘The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very 
uncertainty’.73 It is the widening of the self and the intellect for which philosophy is valuable.74 
The veracity of what Mr. Russell writes is another matter entirely. Most interesting are his 
accounts of universals and knowledge by acquaintance. Of the latter, it is neither knowledge nor 
acquaintance, but mere perception i.e. direct apprehension.75 As for the former, universals are not 
 
 
62 Russell, 1912: 171. 
63 Russell, 1912: 165 f.  
64 Russell, 1912: 186 ff.  
65 Russell, 1912: 178.  
66 Russell, 1912: 186, 217. 
67 Russell, 1912: 190.  
68 Russell, 1912: 217. 
69 Russell, 1912: 207. cf. Gettier, 1963.  
70 Russell, 1912: 226. 
71 Russell, 1992: xix; Russell, 1927. 
72 Russell, 1912: 236. 
73 Russell, 1912: 242.  
74 Russell, 1912: 237 ff. cf. Russell, 1926; Russell, 1992: xix. 
75 Moore, 2014: 77. 
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perceived but conceived, so their apprehension by acquaintance is unclear. Whether Mr. Russell 
intends a Platonic anamnesis is unlikely, but it seems difficult to make much sense of the 
acquaintance with universals without it.  
This notion of acquaintance leads to a bizarre account of introspective knowledge. It seems 
absurd to say that only Bismarck could make a judgment of which he himself was a constituent.76 
One can have an appreciation of the epistemic limitation on passing judgement on others’ selves 
but still maintain that the reality of such selves can be known beyond themselves. Mr. Russell, it 
seems, gets caught up in knowing everything about oneself and, realising its impossibility, forgets 
that something can still be known.  
His foundation of intuitive knowledge77 is less interesting than what he has to say of 
acquaintance, but more problematic. ‘Words like 'intuition' and 'telepathy' are brought in just to 
disguise the fact that no explanation has been found’. 78  Indeed, Mr. Russell admits of his 
argumentative use of intuition that it is ‘doubtless less strong than we could wish’. 79  Like 
acquaintance with universals, it is difficult to make much sense out of the veracity of intuition 
without any appeal to anamnesis. 80  He seems to want the fecundity of Platonism without 
committing himself to the tenets most widely rejected.  
Apart from its brevity, it is astonishing that such a book would come to be regarded as a 
classic in philosophy. How it came to be regarded more highly than G. E. Moore’s book on the 
same topic is unfathomable. Make no mistake, the book is undoubtedly interesting and, 
 
 
76 Bosanquet, 1912: 563; Skorupski, 2001: xi. 
77 Russell, 1912: 31, 35, 38, 39, 172. 
78 Ayer, 1956: 30.  
79 Russell, 1912: 38. 
80 cf. Plato, 1997: 57 ff., 70 ff.  
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considering its brevity, it would be foolish to forgo reading it. But it is not fit to be a classic. It 
simply ignores too much philosophy, and what it does offer is either too widely accepted or too 
highly contested. Of greatest philosophic interest are his accounts of universals and knowledge by 
acquaintance. The former belongs to a paper in 1911,81 the latter to one in 1905.82 It is not right to 
attribute classic status to the book on account of these two ideas.  
 
 
81 Russell, 1911.  
82 Russell, 1905. 
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